the affective measures will be more sensitive than the others will. My hunch is that predominantly cognitive interventions are still likely to have predominantly cognitive effects. Those decisions that are usually associated with strong affective effects may respond favorably to cognitive interventions, and possibly more so to cognitive interventions with augmented support and coaching. And behavioral change will depend on whether the behavior is being driven predominantly by factors that are modifiable by the interventions.
Reaching consensus on standardized measures will be challenging because of the multiplicity of motivations, objectives, and conceptual frameworks used in developing (and therefore evaluating) the interventions. Entwistle et al. 4 have begun to clarify this issue by classifying potential effects of interventions on decision making and health outcomes depending on the model of patient involvement (1, shared decision making; 2, individual informed choice; 3, professional as agent for the patient; 4, promotion of rational decision making; or 5, promotion of a particular choice). For example, one indicator of efficacy using model 5 may be patient compliance with a recommended option, whereas in model 4, an intervention that increases the selection of options that maximize the patients' expected utility may be judged successful. Entwistle et al. also acknowledge5 that promoting "evidence-informed patient choice" is seen by some as the desired end, whereas others see it as a means to other desirable outcomes, such as greater clinical effectiveness, health gain, individually appropriate utilization, reduced expenditures on inappropriate interventions, reduced litigation, etc.
Clearly, the perspective taken by the developer or the potential user will affect one's list of standard-ized criteria for evaluation. However, even if we narrowed the debate to essential criteria for valuebased choices using a non-directive model, several issues emerge. Which ones are essential to include in the developmental studies and in the clinical trials? How independent is one criterion from another? Are some measures surrogates for others? What is a clinically important difference?
As we begin to consider these issues, it is my hope that we can reach a consensus on standardized measures in a period shorter than the 20 years it took us to get this far. In brief, Stalmeier and Bezembinder report results of a carefully-designed pair of laboratory studies done with healthy college students to test a framing-effect explanation of differences in utility functions between two widely-used utility-assessment methods in risky and riskless choice conditions. Their first experiment confirms a previous Editorials * 505 MEDICAL DECISION MAKING finding that utility functions obtained by certaintyequivalent gamble (risky condition) and difference measurement (riskless condition) methods differ significantly from each other, despite controlling for sensitivity to chance. They propose that a shift from gain to loss frames of evaluation (framing effect) is generated by the change of response mode from gamble to difference measurement, accounting for the remaining discrepancy in the utility functions. In the second experiment, this hypothesis is tested against framing effect predictions of prospect theory,5 by altering the gamble task to a loss frame consistent with the difference measurement task. After correction for sensitivity to chance, the results of the second experiment confirm that the utility functions no longer differ significantly from each other, consistent with predictions of prospect theory.
An important theoretical contribution of this research is the identification of a framing effect as a previously undocumented explanation for differences in utilities assessed for risky and riskless decision-making situations. An implication for healthrelated decision making is that the method of utility assessment can be critical to what utility data are obtained, and, consequently what is concluded about the nature of people's preferences for outcomes. Although the importance of measurement methods has previously been recognized, a strength of this paper is the evaluation of study results against prospect theory predictions to provide a specific explanation for the observed differences between measurement methods. This level of understanding of judgment process is important to subsequent efforts to design sound theoretically-based approaches to improve utility-assessment methods.
More specifically, the results provide support for anticipating and controlling for both a framing effect and an effect of sensitivity to chance between risky and riskless methods of utility assessment. The authors discuss a potential policy implication of differences in measurement-methods. Also, at an individual level, a person stating preferences for treatment options for a health problem may provide different information via standard gamble versus a rating method. In addition, the frame of reference is known to be an important influence on perception of outcomes as losses or gains3; i.e., utilities for future outcomes can be influenced by the reference point of the person's current state of health.
While the reported experiments reflect strong internal validity for tests of hypotheses, the generalizability of the results beyond the laboratory remains an empirical question. To promote development of applications to improve decision making, additional research is needed to link results of laboratory studies and features of naturalistic decision-making situations. There are some intriguing possibilities for extensions of the reported research. Certain health problems and treatments involve the type of tradeoff manipulated in the experimental tasks of the research. For example, patients who have severe chronic health problems such as rheumatoid arthritis or cancer may in effect make choices between proposed "poisons" (treatment regimens with probabilities of toxic effects that can worsen health) versus living with the untreated illness. Future research might examine effects of different healthtreatment situations such as these, studying patients with various levels of severity of health problems (differing current health reference points), examining the clinical significance of observed measurement method effects. Self-reports of judgment processes might be incorporated in study designs to assess the insight of study participants about their utilities as assessed by different methods. These approaches, linked with the strengths of the laboratory method, can aid development of interventions to resolve preference inconsistencies induced by the method of assessment. CELIA E. WILLS, PhD, RN Michigan State University College of Nursing East Lansin& Michigan
